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ABSTRACT
We develop a theory of multiproduct firms to analyze the effects of globalization on the distributions
of firm size, scope, and productivity. Our model explains two puzzles. First, it explains the
well-known size-discount puzzle: large firms have lower values of Tobin’s Q than small firms.
Second, it explains the globalization-skewness puzzle documented in the empirical part of our paper:
a multilateral reduction in trade costs leads to a flattening of the size distribution of firms. In our
model, globalization not only affects the distribution of observed productivities but also productivity














snyeapl2@ssc.upenn.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Only 41 percent of US manufacturing ﬁrms manage multiple products, but these ﬁrms account
for 91 percent of sales (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006). Indeed, much of the variation in
sales across ﬁrms is due to large ﬁrms managing more product lines than small ﬁrms.1 This
fact suggests that an important dimension of ﬁrm heterogeneity is in how well ﬁrms cope with
expanding their product range.
Most economic models involve single-product ﬁrms. These models predict that ﬁrms with
lower (constant) marginal costs have larger sales and exhibit a higher value of Tobin’s Q,t h e
ratio between a ﬁrm’s market value and its book value. Hence, there should be a positive re-
lationship between ﬁrm size and Tobin’s Q in the data. Yet there is strong empirical evidence
showing that the opposite is true (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2002). In
Figure 1 we plot the logarithm of Tobin’s Q on the logarithm of ﬁrm sales, using Compus-
tat data for the year 2004. The ﬁgure shows a clear negative relationship between ﬁrm size
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Figure 1: The relationship between the logarithm of Tobin’s Q and the logarithm of ﬁrm sales.
The relationship between intrinsic ﬁrm eﬃciency, observed productivity, and ﬁrm size is
fundamental in understanding the productivity eﬀects of economic policies such as trade lib-
eralization and market integration. There is a large and growing literature that is concerned
1In fact, Berger and Ofek (1995) report that sales per product line are larger for single-product ﬁrms than
for multiproduct ﬁrms.
1with the productivity implications of international trade (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Otta-
viano, 2005). But this literature predicts (as do other standard models of ﬁrm heterogeneity)
a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and Tobin’s Q.
In the empirical part of this paper, we present another puzzle for existing models in which
ﬁrms produce a single product and diﬀer in their marginal costs. Intuition suggests that a
multilateral trade liberalization induces an increase in the intensity of competition and thereby
compresses ﬁrms’ markups over marginal costs. This ampliﬁes small diﬀerences in marginal
costs, and leads to a more skewed domestic size distribution of ﬁrms. (In the Appendix, we
provide a formal exposition of this argument.) As we show in Section 5, the opposite is true in
the data: a technology-driven reduction in shipping costs has induced a less skewed domestic
size distribution of U.S. ﬁrms. That is, as the world has become more globalized, the domestic
size distribution has become ﬂatter, not steeper.
In this paper, we develop a theory of multiproduct ﬁr m st h a ta l l o w su st oe x p l a i nb o t h
puzzles: the size-discount puzzle and the globalization-skewness puzzle. In the equilibrium of
our model, there will be a negative relationship between ﬁrms’ (constant) marginal costs and
ﬁrms’ size. This implies a negative relationship between ﬁrm size and Tobin’s Q,r e s o l v i n gt h e
size-discount puzzle. Further, since ﬁrms with lower marginal costs will sell less, a globalization-
induced increase in the intensity of competition leads to a ﬂattening of the domestic size
distribution, resolving the globalization-skewness puzzle.
Our model has three key ingredients. First, each ﬁrm chooses how many product lines to
manage. Second, there are decreasing returns to the span of control at the ﬁrm level: the more
product lines a ﬁrm chooses to manage, the less good it is at managing each one of it, and
so the higher are its marginal costs. This ingredient is consistent with the ﬁnding by Schoar
(2002) that the total factor productivity of a ﬁrm’s existing product lines decreases when new
product lines are added. Third, ﬁrms diﬀer in their organizational capabilities: the greater is a
ﬁrm’s organizational capability, (i) the lower are its marginal costs, holding ﬁxed the number
of product lines, and (ii) the less responsive are marginal costs to increases in the number of
product lines.
In equilibrium, each ﬁrm chooses the number of product lines so that the proﬁto ft h e
m a r g i n a lp r o d u c tl i n ei se q u a lt ot h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect that the marginal product line exerts on
the proﬁts of the inframarginal product lines. Suppose ﬁrm 1 chooses the number of product
lines optimally, while ﬁrm 2, having better organizational capability than ﬁrm 1, chooses the
number of product lines in such a way that its marginal costs are the same as those of ﬁrm 1.
In this case, the proﬁt of the marginal product line is the same for both ﬁrms but — since ﬁrm
2 has greater organizational capability — the marginal product line of ﬁr m2i m p o s e sas m a l l e r
negative eﬀect on the proﬁts of its inframarginal product lines. This implies that ﬁrm 2 should
optimally add product lines so that its marginal costs are higher than those of ﬁrm 1. Hence,
ﬁrms with greater organizational capability have higher marginal costs — and thus lower values
of Tobin’s Q —t h a nﬁrms with inferior organizational capability. This solves the size-discount
puzzle.
We embed our theory of multiproduct ﬁrms in a two-country model of international trade
in order to analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization and market integration. We show that a
multilateral trade liberalization leads to a less skewed size distribution: large ﬁrms downsize
2by selling product lines while small ﬁrms expand the number of product lines. Our model thus
generates a surge of (partial) ﬁrm acquisitions and divestitures following a trade liberalization,
which is consistent with the data (e.g., Breinlich, 2005). A trade liberalization aﬀects produc-
tivity both at the level of the ﬁrm and the industry. Average industry productivity can be
shown to increase as high-cost ﬁrms downsize while low-cost ﬁrms expand. In the empirical
part of the paper, we use Compustat data on publicly traded U.S. manufacturing companies.
Our empirical results conﬁrm the model’s predictions that a multilateral reduction in shipping
costs is associated with a ﬂattening of the domestic size distribution: the globalization-skewness
puzzle.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the recent and growing literature that is
concerned with the within-industry reallocation eﬀects of trade liberalization (e.g., Melitz,
2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005). In these papers, ﬁrms diﬀer in their constant and exogenous
marginal costs, and each ﬁrm produces a single product. The papers cannot explain the size-
discount and globalization-skewness puzzles.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on multiproduct ﬁrms and endogenous ﬁrm
scope. The industrial organization literature on this topic (e.g., Brander and Eaton, 1984;
Shaked and Sutton, 1990; Johnson and Myatt, 2003) assumes that ﬁrms are identical and
focusses on strategic eﬀects. An exception is Santalo (2002) where ﬁr m sa r ep r i c et a k e r si n
each market and diﬀer in their diseconomies of scope. In international trade, there is a nascent
literature concerned with ﬁrm scope as an additional “margin of adjustment” for resource
allocation. Eckel and Neary (2005) explore how trade liberalization aﬀects the optimal scope
of identical ﬁrms. In a model with ﬁrm heterogeneity, Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2005)
focus on the eﬀects of trade liberalization on average productivity. Baldwin and Gu (2005)
extend the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) by allowing for multiproduct ﬁrms.
There is a small literature in corporate ﬁnance that attempts to explain the size-discount
puzzle. Most of these papers, including Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), provide an ex-
planation based on agency costs that result in the misallocation of resources across divisions.
In recent work, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argue that the size-discount puzzle can better
be explained by diseconomies of scope rather than agency problems. This literature is not
concerned with the skewness of the size distribution, nor with globalization.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst that considers the eﬀects of globalization
on the skewness of the size distribution of ﬁrms. One of the few empirical papers that has a
bearing on the link between globalization and ﬁrm size is Head and Ries (1999). They show that
a reduction in Canadian tariﬀs reduces the average size of Canadian plants, while a reduction
in U.S. tariﬀs has the opposite eﬀect. But they do not analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization
on the skewness of the size distribution.2
Plan of the Paper. In the next section, we present our theory of multiproduct ﬁrms in a
simple environment where each ﬁrm is a monopolist for each of its products. We show that ﬁrms
with greater organizational capability choose to have higher marginal costs and thus a lower
2In industrial organization, there is a large literature on the shape of the size distribution of ﬁrms; see Sutton
(1997) for a survey. More recently, Cabral and Mata (2003) explore the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on the
skewness of the size distribution. Sutton (1998) derives a bound on the size distribution of ﬁrms, based on
aggregation eﬀects across independent submarkets.
3value of Tobin’s Q. In Section 3, we extend the model by allowing ﬁrms to export their products
to a foreign market. We show that a reduction in trade costs leads to a merger wave and a
decrease in the skewness of the ﬁrm size distribution. In Section 4, we introduce monopolistic
competition (and free entry) into the two-country version of our model. We show that a
multilateral trade liberalization leads to a less skewed domestic size distribution, while the
opposite result obtains in the liberalization country following a unilateral trade liberalization.
In Section 5, we test and conﬁrm the predictions of our model on the eﬀect of globalization on
the domestic size distribution. We conclude in Section 6.
2 A Theory of Endogenous Firm Scope
This section is organized as follows. We ﬁrst introduce our theory of multiproduct ﬁrms that
diﬀer in their organizational capabilities and that choose how many product lines to manage.
We then analyze how ﬁrms with diﬀerent organizational capabilities solve the fundamental
trade oﬀ between ﬁrm scope and productivity.
2.1 The Model
There is a mass M of atomless ﬁrms that diﬀer in their organizational capabilities. A ﬁrm’s




,w h e r eθ > 0, and the distribution of organi-
zational capabilities in the population of ﬁrms is given by the distribution function G.E a c h
ﬁrm can manage any number n ≥ 1 of product lines. (For simplicity, we will treat n as a
continuous variable.) We assume that ﬁrms have constant marginal costs at the product level
but decreasing returns to the span of control at the ﬁrm level: the more product lines a ﬁrm
manages, the higher are its marginal costs for each product line.
The ﬁrm faces two types of costs. First, there is a ﬁxed cost r per product line. This can
be thought of as either a cost of inventing a product or as a cost of purchasing an existing
product line. Second, there is a constant marginal cost c(n;θ) associated with the production
of each unit of output, which is the same for all n product lines. This marginal cost function
has the following properties. First, an increase in the number of product lines increases a
ﬁrm’s marginal cost, ∂c(n;θ)/∂n > 0.T h i sp r o p e r t yi ss u g g e s t e db ySchoar’s (2002) empirical
ﬁnding that adding new product lines decreases the total factor productivity of all inframarginal
product lines. Second, we want to abstract from exogenous cost diﬀerences amongst single-
product ﬁrms and focus instead on the idea that organizational capability is about how good
ﬁrms are at coordinating the production of multiple products. We thus assume that c(1;θ) is
independent of θ and that ∂2c(n;θ)/∂n∂θ < 0. This implies that, holding ﬁxed the number
n>1 of product lines, ﬁrms with greater organizational capability have lower marginal costs:
∂c(n;θ)/∂θ < 0 for n>1. To capture these properties and for simplicity, we assume that
organizational capability θ is the inverse of the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the
number of product lines:
c(n;θ)=c0n1/θ. (1)
On the demand side, product lines are symmetric, and there are no demand linkages (and,
hence, no cannibalization eﬀects). For each product line, a ﬁrm faces inverse market demand
4P(q),w h e r eq is the quantity sold of that product. We assume that demand is downward-
sloping, P0(q) < 0 for all q such that P(q) > 0. Further, we impose a mild regularity condition
on the inverse demand function which is familiar from Cournot oligopoly and requires that
demand is not too convex:
P0(q)+qP00(q) < 0 for all q>0 such that P(q) > 0. (2)
Each ﬁrm’s optimization problem consists in choosing the number of product lines, n,a n d
the quantity for each product line k, qk,s oa st om a x i m i z ei t sp r o ﬁt. (Since each ﬁrm is
a monopolist for each of its product lines, it could equivalently choose price pk rather than
quantity.)
2.2 The Optimal Choice of Firm Scope
Consider a ﬁrm with organizational capability θ.W eﬁrst analyze the ﬁrm’s quantity-setting
problem, holding ﬁxed the number n of product lines. Since the ﬁrm has the same (constant)
marginal cost for each product line and the demand function is the same for each product
line, the ﬁrm will optimally sell the same quantity of each product line. Let q(c(n;θ)) denote
the proﬁt-maximizing quantity per product line of a ﬁrm with organizational capability θ that
manages n product lines. Since there are no demand linkages between product lines, the ﬁrm’s
quantity-setting problem can be analyzed separately for each product line. Hence,
q(c(n;θ)) ≡ argmax
q [P(q) − c(n;θ)]q.
The ﬁrst-order condition is given by
P(q(c(n;θ))) − c(n;θ)+q(c(n;θ))P0(q(c(n;θ))) = 0. (3)
We consider now the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of the number of product lines. Given the optimal




π(c(n;θ)) ≡ [P(q(c(n;θ))) − c(n;θ)]q(c(n;θ)) (4)
is the ﬁrm’s gross proﬁt per product line. From the envelope theorem, π0(c(n(θ);θ)) =
−q(c(n(θ);θ)),a n ds ot h eﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of the number of product
lines, n(θ), can be written as
[π(c(n(θ);θ)) − r] − n(θ)q(c(n(θ);θ))
∂c(n(θ);θ)
∂n
=0 .( 5 )
The impact of an additional product line on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be decomposed into two
eﬀects. The ﬁrst term on the l.h.s. of equation (5) is the net proﬁt of the marginal product
line. The second term summarizes the negative eﬀect that the marginal product line imposes
5on the n(θ) inframarginal product lines: the production cost of each product line increases by
q(c(n(θ);θ))∂c(n(θ);θ)/∂n since the ﬁrm is now less good at managing each one of them. We
will henceforth refer to this second term as the “inframarginal cost eﬀect”.
From the cost function (1), n(θ)∂c(n(θ);θ)/∂n =( 1 /θ)c(n(θ);θ). Hence, the optimal choice
of the number of product lines, n(θ), enters the ﬁrst-order condition (5) only through the
induced marginal cost c(n(θ);θ). This means that the ﬁrm’s problem can equivalently be
viewed as one of choosing c rather than n. Indeed, using the gross proﬁt function (4), the
ﬁrst-order condition can be rewritten as
Ψ(c(θ);θ) ≡ [P(q(c(θ))) − c(θ)]q(c(θ)) − r −
c(θ)
θ
q(c(θ)) = 0, (6)
where c(θ) ≡ c(n(θ);θ).
Henceforth, we will assume that the ﬁxed cost r is not too large so that the ﬁrm can make
a strictly positive proﬁt by managing a single product line, i.e.,
π(c0)=[ P(q(c0)) − c0]q(c0) >r .
We are now in the position to state our central result on the relationship between a ﬁrm’s
organizational capability and its observed productivity.
Proposition 1 The optimal choice of product lines is such that the induced marginal cost c(θ)
is weakly increasing in the ﬁrm’s organizational capability θ.S p e c i ﬁcally, there exists a unique
cutoﬀ e θ such that c(θ)=c0 for all θ ≤ e θ,a n dc(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for all θ ≥ e θ.
Proof. See Appendix.
For a given number n of product lines, the inframarginal cost eﬀect that the marginal
product line exerts is the smaller, the greater is the ﬁrm’s organizational capability. Not
surprisingly then, ﬁrms with greater organizational capability will optimally choose a weakly
larger number of product lines than ﬁrms with inferior organizational capability: n(θ)=1for
θ ≤ e θ,a n dn(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for θ ≥ e θ. Perhaps paradoxically, however, for θ ≥ e θ,
n(θ) is increasing so fast with θ that ﬁrms with greater organizational capability will, in fact,
exhibit higher unit costs. To see this, consider two ﬁrms, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, with organizational
capability θ1 ≥ e θ and θ2 >θ 1, respectively. From the ﬁrst-order condition (6), ﬁrm 1 will
optimally choose n(θ1) such that its marginal cost c(θ1) satisﬁes Ψ(c(θ1);θ1)=0 . Suppose
now ﬁrm 2 were to choose the number of product lines such that its induced marginal cost
is also equal to c(θ1).I f s o ,t h e t w o ﬁrms would sell the same quantity q(c(θ1)) per product
line, and thus fetch the same price P(q(c(θ1))). Hence, the net proﬁt of the marginal product
line, [P(q(c(θ))) − c(θ)]q(c(θ)) − r, would be the same for the two ﬁrms. However, as can
be seen from equation (6), the absolute value of the inframarginal cost eﬀect imposed by the
marginal product line, χ(c(θ);θ) ≡ (1/θ)c(θ)q(c(θ)),i ss m a l l e rf o rt h eﬁrm with the greater
organizational capability, and so Ψ(c(θ1);θ2) > 0. Hence, ﬁrm 2 can increase its proﬁtb y
further adding product lines, even though this implies higher unit costs, c(θ2) >c (θ1).T h i si s










Figure 2: The induced choice of marginal cost balances the net proﬁt per product line, π(c)−r,
and the inframarginal cost eﬀect, χ(c;θ).Aﬁrm with greater organizational capability, θ2 >θ 1,
chooses to have higher marginal costs, c(θ2) >c (θ1).
7Remark 1 For convenience, we have chosen a particular functional form for marginal cost
c(n;θ) that permits a simple interpretation of organizational capability θ as the inverse of
the (constant) elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the number of product lines. But






denote the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to n. It can be shown that Proposition 1 holds
if (i) c(n;θ) is strictly increasing in n, and weakly decreasing in θ;a n d( i i )ε(n;θ) is strictly













< 0 for all n ≥ 1 and θ ∈ [θ,θ].
Proposition 1 shows that observed unit cost is inversely related to the ﬁrm’s intrinsic
eﬃciency (its organizational capability θ). This raises a potentially important conceptual issue
for empirical work that attempts to identify a ﬁrm’s intrinsic eﬃciency from its costs. Our
model shows that even if unit costs are observable such an exercise is valid only if one corrects








In practice, it is often hard to measure costs correctly. A popular alternative measure of





where m(θ) i st h em a r k e tv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm (including its assets) and b(θ) the book value of the
assets used by the ﬁrm (independently of whether the assets are rented or owned). The ﬁrm’s
assets are its product lines as well as any capital it uses for production. Suppose each ﬁrm has
a Cobb-Douglas production function and α is the capital share in production costs. Then, the
ﬁrm’s book value is given by
b(θ)=n(θ)r + n(θ)αc(θ)q(c(θ)),
where the ﬁrst term is the book value of the product lines and the second term the book value
of the capital used for production. The market value of the ﬁrm (and its assets) is given by
m(θ)=n(θ)P(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ)) − n(θ)(1 − α)c(θ)q(c(θ)),
where the ﬁrst term is revenue and the second term labor costs. The next lemma shows that
the market-to-book ratio is negatively related to a ﬁrm’s intrinsic eﬃciency.
Lemma 1 A ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), T(θ), is decreasing in the ﬁrm’s organi-
zational capability θ.
8Proof. See Appendix.
Our model predicts a relationship between organizational capability θ and various measures
of ﬁrm size. Let
S(θ) ≡ n(θ)q(c(θ))P(q(c(θ)))
denote the sales of a ﬁrm with organizational capability θ.
Lemma 2 A ﬁrm’s sales S(θ),b o o kv a l u eb(θ), and market value m(θ) a r ei n c r e a s i n gi nt h e
ﬁrm’s organizational capability θ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 establishes a negative relationship between Tobin’s Q and organizational capa-
bility, while Lemma 2 establishes a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and organizational
capability. As shown in the following proposition, our model can explain the size-discount
puzzle found in the data.
Proposition 2 A ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), T(θ), is inversely related to various
measures of ﬁrm size: sales S(θ),b o o kv a l u eb(θ), and market value m(θ).
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between market-to-book ratio and ﬁrm size is
consistent with our model, but contradicts standard models of ﬁrm heterogeneity where ﬁrms
diﬀer in their constant marginal costs.3 While there is strong empirical evidence showing
a negative relationship between Tobin’s Q and ﬁrm size, there are a number of empirical
papers (e.g., Schoar, 2002) that ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and total factor
productivity. There is, however, good reason to be skeptical about any cross-ﬁrm comparison
in measured total factor productivity: the data does not contain information on input quality.
In particular, it is well known that large ﬁrms pay higher wages, and many authors have argued
that this is, at least in part, because they hire better workers. This implies that any empirical
study of total factor productivity that does not account for input quality overestimates the total
factor productivity of large ﬁrms compared to small ﬁrms. Our model naturally gives rise to the
positive relationship between average wages and ﬁrm size found in the data if managing many
product lines requires the ﬁrm to hire more highly talented workers to oversee and coordinate
production.
Our model also predicts a negative relationship across ﬁrms between the number of product
lines, n(θ), and sales per product, P(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ)). Indeed, taking the derivative of sales per
product with respect to θ and using the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal output, (3), yields
dP(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ))/dθ = c(θ)q0(c(θ))c0(θ), which is strictly negative for θ>e θ since q0(c(θ)) < 0
3Consider, for example, Melitz (2003). Since consumers have CES preferences, a ﬁrm with eﬃciency ϕ charges
a constant markup over marginal cost, p(ϕ)/c(ϕ)=ρ>1, and output is of the form q(ϕ)=γc(ϕ)
−ε ,w h e r e
γ>0 and ε>1. Tobin’s Q c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s
T(ϕ)=




which is decreasing in ﬁrm eﬃciency ϕ,w h i l eﬁrm sales are increasing in ϕ.
9and c0(θ) > 0.N o t i n gt h a tn(θ) is increasing in θ, the asserted negative relationship between
n(θ) and P(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ)) then follows. This prediction is consistent with the empirical ev-
idence presented in Berger and Ofek (1995), who document that the mean sales per product
line of single-product ﬁrms are about 20 percent higher than those of multi-product ﬁrms.
In this section, we have assumed that each ﬁrm acts as a monopolist for each one of
its product lines. Alternatively, we could have assumed monopolistic competition between
ﬁrms. If the residual demand curve that ﬁrms face for each product line satisﬁes the mild
regularity condition we imposed on P(·), Proposition 1 carries over to this setting: ﬁrms with
greater organizational capability have higher unit costs than ﬁrms with inferior organizational
capability.
3 Trade Costs and the Size Distribution of Firms
In this section, we extend our model by introducing a second country to which ﬁrms can export.
We then study the eﬀects of changes in trade costs on ﬁrm scope, aggregate productivity, and
the size distribution of ﬁrms.
For notational simplicity, we assume that market demand is the same in both countries.
(None of our results depend on this assumption.) A ﬁrm that exports to the foreign country
incurs two types of trade costs: a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ and iceberg-type transport costs. Speciﬁcally,
if c(n;θ) denotes the marginal cost of production of a type-θ ﬁrm managing n product lines,
then
τc(n;θ)+t
is this ﬁrm’s marginal cost of serving the foreign market, where τ ≥ 1 and t ≥ 0. We assume
that τ −1 and t are suﬃciently small so that each ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to sell in both countries.
In this section, we are concerned with the short-run eﬀects of a change in trade costs. By
short run, we mean that the mass M of ﬁrms and the mass N>Mof product lines is ﬁxed. We
may think of M and N being in pre-shock long-run equilibrium. While the mass N of product
lines is ﬁxed in the short-run, ﬁrms can buy and sell product lines at an endogenous market
price r. Trade in product lines correspond to partial acquisitions and divestitures, which are
about half of all M&A activity in the US (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001).
A ﬁrm makes output decisions separately for each country. If e c is the ﬁrm’s marginal cost
of serving a particular market, then
q(e c) ≡ argmax
q [P(q) − e c]q
denotes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing output for that market. The ﬁrst-order condition for
optimal output choice is given by
P(q(e c)) − e c + q(e c)P0(q(e c)) = 0. (7)
Let π(c(n;θ)) denote the gross proﬁt per product line of a type-θ ﬁrm managing n product
lines:
π(c(n;θ)) = [P(q(c(n;θ))) − c(n;θ)]q(c(n;θ))+[P(q(τc(n;θ)+t)) − τc(n;θ) − t]q(τc(n;θ)+t),
10where the ﬁrst term is the gross proﬁt in the domestic market and the second term is the gross
proﬁt in the foreign market. The ﬁrm’s problem of choosing the optimal number n(θ;t) of
production lines can then be written as
max
n n[π(c(n;θ)) − r].
























where c(θ) ≡ c(n(θ);θ). It is straightforward to show that Propositions 1 and 2 carry over
this setting: ﬁrms with greater organizational capability have higher marginal costs and lower
values of Tobin’s Q. For convenience, we will assume that θ is suﬃciently large so that for all
ﬁrms with organizational capability θ ∈ [θ,θ], the implicit choice of c(θ) i sg i v e nb yt h es o l u t i o n
to the ﬁrst-order condition Φ(c(θ);θ;τ;t)=0 ,a n ds on(θ) ≡ [c(θ)/c0]
θ > 1.
Since the mass M of ﬁrms and the mass N>Mof product lines are ﬁxed in the short run,
the endogenous market price of a product line, r, must adjust to ensure market clearing. The





We deﬁne a short-run equilibrium as the collection {q(·),n(·),c(·),r} satisfying the cost
function (1), the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal output, (7), the ﬁrst-order condition for the
choice of the number of product lines, (8), and the merger market clearing condition (9).
We now consider a small increase in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t. We will show that, under some
reasonable condition on demand, the rise in trade costs will lead to a more skewed size distrib-
ution of ﬁrms: (large) high-θ ﬁrms will expand by purchasing product lines from (small) low-θ
ﬁrms. Hence, c(θ) will increase for high-θ ﬁrms and decrease for low-θ ﬁrms.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of
the number of product lines, (8), we obtain dc(θ)/dt = −Φt(c(θ);θ;τ;t)/Φc(c(θ);θ;τ;t),w h e r e
Φs denotes the partial derivative of Φ with respect to s ∈ {c,t}. Since the ﬁrst-order condition
deﬁnes a proﬁtm a x i m u m ,Φc(c(θ);θ;τ;t) < 0,a n ds ot h es i g no fdc(θ)/dt is equal to the sign














An increase in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t has the following eﬀects on the marginal net beneﬁto fa n
additional product line. First, it reduces the gross proﬁt per product line; this is the ﬁrst
11term on the r.h.s. of the last equation. Second, it changes the endogenous market price of a
product line; this is the second term, and it is the same for all ﬁrms. Third, the higher tariﬀ
induces ﬁrms to produce less output per product line, and thereby reduces the inframarginal
cost eﬀect; this is the third term. This change in the inframarginal cost eﬀect is the product of
two factors: (i) the absolute value of the fractional change in the ﬁrm’s shipped world output
per product line4 due to the increase in t, and (ii) the size of the inframarginal cost eﬀect itself.
From the ﬁrst-order condition (8), the inframarginal cost eﬀect is equal to the net proﬁtp e r









[π(c(θ)) − r], (10)
where θ enters only through c(θ).
In order to understand what types of ﬁrms have more incentives to acquire additional
product lines, we need to analyze how the change in the marginal net beneﬁt of an additional
product line, induced by a tariﬀ increase, varies across ﬁrms with diﬀerent organizational
capabilities. This analysis is simpliﬁed because of the following envelope-type result (which










On the l.h.s. is the derivative of the ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of (10) with respect to c,w h i l et h e
r.h.s. is the derivative of the third term on the r.h.s. of (10) with respect to c, holding ﬁxed
the ﬁrst factor of this term. Hence, when taking the derivative of equation (10) with respect
to θ,w ea r el e f tw i t h
dΦt(c(θ);θ;τ;t)
dθ









This means that in order to understand how the change in the marginal net beneﬁto fa na d -
ditional product line, induced by a tariﬀ increase, varies with θ, we need to consider only how
the fractional change in the ﬁrm’s shipped world output per product line varies with the ﬁrm’s
organizational capability. Intuitively, ﬁrms that optimally choose a larger fractional drop in
output per product line have therefore more incentives to add product lines than other ﬁrms.
Indeed, since c0(θ) > 0 from Proposition 1 and since the net proﬁt per product line is positive,
dΦt(c(θ);θ;τ;t)/dθ is positive if the condition d{−τq0(τc(θ)+t)/[q(c(θ)) + τq(τc(θ)+t)]} > 0
holds. As transport costs become small, τ → 1 and t → 0, this condition becomes d{−q0(c)/q(c)} >
0. We will assume that P00(q) and P000(q) are not too large so that −τq0(τc+t)/[q(c)+τq(τc+t)]
is strictly increasing in c. In particular, this assumption holds if demand is linear.
We have thus shown that, under our assumption on demand, dc(θ)/dt is strictly increasing
in θ. Since the mass of product lines is ﬁxed in the short run, dc(θ)/dt cannot be positive for
all θ since this would mean that all ﬁrms are adding product lines. Similarly, dc(θ)/dt cannot
4Because of iceberg-type transport costs, the ﬁrm ships τq(τc(θ)+t) units of output to the foreign country,
but only q(τc(θ)+t) units arrive there.
12be negative for all θ since this would mean that all ﬁrms are selling product lines. Hence, the









respond to an increase in





respond to an increase in t by buying product lines (and so dc(θ)/dt > 0).
We summarize the eﬀect of an increase in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume d{−τq0(τc+ t)/[q(c)+τq(τc+ t)]}/dc > 0 for all c ≥ c0, and con-
sider a small increase in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t. In short-run equilibrium, there exists a threshold














The proposition implies that any change in trade costs induces a “merger wave” in the
short run. Following an increase in trade costs, small ﬁrms sell product lines to large ﬁrms,
and so the size distribution of ﬁrms becomes more skewed, while the opposite result obtains
following a reduction in trade costs. Proposition 3 is concerned with the eﬀect of changes in the
speciﬁct a r i ﬀ. As the following proposition shows, the same qualitative result obtains following
an increase in the iceberg-type transport costs.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the demand condition of Proposition 3 holds, and assume that
d[−q0(c)/q(c)]/dc > 0 for all c ≥ c0. Consider a small increase in the iceberg transport









, whereas dn(θ)/dτ > 0 for






While the phrasing of the proposition suggests that Proposition 4 requires a stronger con-
dition on demand than Proposition 3, this is not the case. In fact, for small trade costs, τ ≈ 1
and t ≈ 0, the prediction of Proposition 4 obtains under a fairly weak condition, namely if
the absolute value of the elasticity of output with respect to marginal cost is increasing in
marginal cost, d[−cq0(c)/q(c)]/dc > 0. In the remainder of this section, we assume that the
demand conditions of Propositions 3 and 4 are satisﬁed. The following corollary is an immediate
implication of Propositions 3 and 4 and Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 Consider a reduction in trade costs, i.e., either a decrease in t or in τ.T h e n ,
ﬁrms with large market-to-book ratios T(θ) purchase product lines from ﬁrms with small market-
to-book ratios.
To the extent that much of the merger and acquisition activity is due to “globalization”
(or, alternatively, positive productivity shocks), our model predicts that ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hv a l u e s
of Tobin’s Q buy corporate assets from ﬁrms with low Tobin’s Q. This is indeed consistent
with the empirical evidence summarized by Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001).
13Propositions 3 and 4 suggest that an increase in trade costs induces a more skewed size
distribution of ﬁrms. This intuition is indeed correct, as the following proposition shows, if one
measures the size of a ﬁrm with organizational capability θ by its domestic sales (or revenue)
S(θ) ≡ n(θ)P(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ)).
Proposition 5 An increase in trade costs — either in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t or in the iceberg-type
transport cost τ — increases (decreases) the domestic sales of a type-θ ﬁrm, S(θ),i fa n do n l y
if it induces an increase (decrease) in the optimal choice of the number of product lines n(θ).
















4 Monopolistic Competition: Trade Liberalization and the Size
Distribution of Firms
In this section, we turn to the eﬀects of trade liberalization and market integration on ﬁrm
s c o p ea n dt h es i z ed i s t r i b u t i o no fﬁrms in a two-country model with monopolistic competition.
We are concerned with the eﬀects of trade liberalization both in the short run, where the
number of ﬁrms and the aggregate number of product lines is ﬁxed, and the long run, where
the number of ﬁrms and the aggregate number of product lines are endogenous.
There are two countries, country 1 and country 2, and a population of atomless ﬁrms in
each. Firms can sell in both countries but can produce only in their home country. In this
section, we will refer to c(n;θ), which is again given by (1), as the ﬁrm’s marginal cost, and
to the additive cost parameter t as the transport cost or tariﬀ. The transport cost or tariﬀ
i si n d e x e db yac o u n t r yp a i r(i,j): tij is the transport cost or tariﬀ per unit of output from
country i to country j. Transport costs and tariﬀs have to be incurred only for exports from
one country to the other, and so t11 = t22 =0 , t12 > 0,a n dt21 > 0.C o u n t r i e sd i ﬀer only in
their tariﬀs.












where x(k) is consumption of product line k, H is consumption of the Hicksian composite
commodity, and σ>0 is a parameter that measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation. As-
suming that consumer income is suﬃciently large, each consumer’s inverse demand for product
line k is then given by
p(k)=1− 2x(k) − 4σ
Z
x(l)dl.
We assume that each ﬁrm can set a diﬀerent output (or price) in the two countries. Since
each product line is of measure zero, a ﬁrm’s choice of output for one product line does not
14aﬀect its choice of output for another product line. Consider now a ﬁrm with marginal cost c
from country i selling in country j (which may or may not be the same country). It can be
shown that its proﬁt-maximizing output qij(c) and gross proﬁt per product line πij(c) from









(aj − tij − c)2, i,j =1 ,2,
respectively, where aj is the endogenous residual demand intercept in country j. This endoge-













where µij is the Borel measure over marginal costs of those product lines that are produced
in country i and sold in country j. To simplify notation, we will henceforth normalize market
size L ≡ 8.
We will focus on the case where the tariﬀs imposed by the two countries are initially the
same, t12 = t21 = t, so that the demand intercepts are also the same, a1 = a2 = a.I f t is
suﬃciently small, as we will henceforth assume, then each ﬁrm will ﬁn di to p t i m a lt os e l li n
both countries.5










{[ai − ci(θ)] + [aj − tij − ci(θ)]}
=0 , (13)
where ci(θ)=c0 [ni(θ)]
1/θ is the implicit choice of marginal cost by a ﬁrm with organizational
capability θ based in country i,a n dri the ﬁxed cost per product line in country i.A s i n




, is such that this





implicit function theorem to (13), we obtain
c0
i(θ)=
ci(θ){[ai − ci(θ)] + [aj − tij − ci(θ)]}
θ2 {[ai − ci(θ)] + [aj − tij − ci(θ)]} + θ{[ai − 2ci(θ)] + [aj − tij − 2ci(θ)]}
. (14)
Since each ﬁrm makes positive sales from selling in each country, ai >c i(θ) and aj >t ij+ci(θ),
the ﬁrst-order condition (13) implies that θ{[ai − ci(θ)] + [aj − tij − ci(θ)]} > 2ci(θ).I tt h e n
follows that Proposition 1 carries over the two-country setting with monopolistic competition:
c0
i(θ) > 0.
5As u ﬃcient condition is that t<2a/(2 + θ).
15Let Mi denote the mass of ﬁrms producing in country i,a n dNi t h em a s so fp r o d u c tl i n e s







,i 6= j, i =1 ,2. (15)
Aggregating the endogenous numbers of product lines over all Mi ﬁrms from country i yields




ni(θ)dG(θ), i =1 ,2. (16)
A change in trade costs will lead to diﬀerent responses across ﬁrms in their choice of the
number of product lines, and these diﬀerent responses will alter the distribution of induced
marginal costs and, hence, the endogenous demand intercept a. The following lemma shows
how a and average marginal costs change when high-θ ﬁrms add product lines while low-θ ﬁrms
reduce the number of product lines.
Lemma 3 Suppose there exist marginal types b θ1 and b θ2 such that all ﬁrms in country i ∈ {1,2}
with organizational capability θ>b θi divest product lines, ∆ni(θ) < 0 for θ>b θi,w h i l ea l lo t h e r
ﬁrms in country i add product lines, ∆ni(θ) > 0 for θ<b θi, holding the total mass of product
lines in each country i ﬁxed,
R
∆ni(θ)dG(θ)=0 . Then, the weighted average (by the number









Hence, the endogenous demand intercept ai decreases, ∆ai < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now turn to the short-run and long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization and market inte-
gration.
4.1 The Short-Run Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization
In short-run equilibrium, the mass of ﬁrms producing in country i, Mi,i sﬁxed, as is the mass
of product lines managed by these ﬁrms, Ni. Since the location of production of a product
line is assumed to be ﬁxed in the short run (and there is no foreign direct investment), the
endogenous (short-run) market price of a product line, ri,m a yd i ﬀer across countries. We
can then deﬁne a short-run equilibrium as a collection {ci(·),n i(·),a i,r i}2
i=1 satisfying the cost
equation (1), the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of the number of product lines,
(13), the equation for the endogenous demand intercept, (15), and the merger market condition
(16).
We now analyze the short-run eﬀects of multilateral and unilateral tariﬀ changes on ﬁrm
s c o p ea n dt h es i z ed i s t r i b u t i o no fﬁrms. For this purpose, we assume that, prior to the change
in tariﬀs, the two countries are identical: N1 = N2 = N, M1 = M2 = M,a n dt12 = t21 = t.
We ﬁrst consider a small symmetric reduction in the common tariﬀ t.
16Proposition 6 Suppose that the countries impose identical tariﬀs, t12 = t21 = t,a n dc o n s i d e r
the short-run eﬀects of a small symmetric trade liberalization, dt < 0. There exists a marginal
type b θ ∈ (θ,θ) such that all ﬁrms with organizational capability θ>b θ respond by divesting prod-
uct lines, while all ﬁrms with organizational capability θ<b θ respond by purchasing additional
product lines.
Proof. See Appendix.
In response to a multilateral trade liberalization, large ﬁrms decide to downsize by divesting
product lines. If the market price of a product line were unchanged, all ﬁrms would actually
want to purchase product lines. But the number of product lines is ﬁxed, and so the price
per product line r increases in response to a multilateral trade liberalization. Given this
endogenous price increase, only the ﬁrms with the lowest marginal costs (i.e., the ﬁrms with
inferior organizational capability) ﬁnd it optimal to add product lines. Proposition 6 thus
mirrors our earlier result, Proposition 3, on the eﬀects of a change in trade costs when each
ﬁrm is a monopolist for each of its product lines. A crucial step in the proof consists in showing
that the “indirect eﬀect” of a multilateral trade liberalization through a change in the intensity
of competition (i.e., through the endogenous demand intercept a) does not outweigh the “direct
eﬀect” identiﬁed in the earlier proposition.
Proposition 6 in conjunction with Lemma 3 implies that a multilateral trade liberalization
reduces the weighted (by number of product lines) average production costs in the industry. To
the extent that the Canadian-U.S. free-trade agreement can be viewed as a multilateral trade
liberalization, this last prediction is consistent with Treﬂer (2004), who attributes a 15 percent
increase in average labor productivity in Canada to the free-trade agreement.
Next, we consider a small unilateral reduction in the tariﬀ i m p o s e db yc o u n t r y1o ni m p o r t s
from country 2, t21.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the countries initially impose identical tariﬀs, t12 = t21 = t,a n d
consider the short-run eﬀects of a small unilateral trade liberalization by country 1, dt21 < 0.
In the liberalizing country 1, there exists a marginal type b θ1 ∈ (θ,θ) such that all ﬁrms with
organizational capability θ>b θ1 respond by purchasing additional product lines, while all ﬁrms
with organizational capability θ<b θ1 respond by divesting product lines. In contrast, in country
2, there exists a marginal type b θ2 ∈ (θ,θ) such that all ﬁrms with organizational capability
θ>b θ2 respond by divesting product lines, while all ﬁrms with organizational capability θ<b θ2
respond by purchasing additional product lines.
Proof. See Appendix.
The short-run eﬀects of a unilateral trade liberalization are very diﬀerent from those of
a multilateral trade liberalization. In the liberalizing country 1, increased competition with
foreign ﬁrms induces the largest ﬁrms to add product lines while the smallest ﬁrms become
even smaller as they divest product lines. Hence, a country that unilaterally reduces its trade
barriers with the rest of the world will experience a steepening of the size distribution of its
ﬁrms. The improved access of country-2 ﬁrms to country 1’s market has the opposite impact
on ﬁrms in that country: the size distribution of ﬁrms producing in country 2 becomes ﬂatter
as large ﬁrms contract and small ﬁrms expand. That is, for the non-liberalizing country 2, the
qualitative eﬀects are the same as for a multilateral trade liberalization.
174.2 The Long-Run Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization
In our analysis of the eﬀects of trade liberalization on ﬁr ms c o p ea n dt h es i z ed i s t r i b u t i o no f
ﬁrms, we have assumed so far that the mass of ﬁrms and the aggregate mass of product lines
produced in each country is ﬁxed. Here, we consider a diﬀerent set of assumptions: we assume
that both the mass of ﬁrms and the aggregate mass of product lines will adjust in response to
changes in tariﬀs. We are thus concerned with the long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization.
Speciﬁcally, there is a suﬃciently large mass of ex ante identical potential entrants. If a
ﬁrm decides to enter, it has to pay a ﬁxed entry cost φ;i fi td e c i d e sn o tt oe n t e r ,i to b t a i n s
ap a y o ﬀ normalized to zero. After paying the entry cost, a ﬁrm receives a random draw of
its organizational capability θ from the c.d.f. G(·).Aﬁrm then decides on the number of its
product lines. In both countries, the ﬁxed development cost per product line is r. We assume
that the life span of each product line is limited, which implies that, in long-run equilibrium, the
market price of each product line is equal to the exogenous development cost r, and the merger
market does not play any allocative role. Since potential entrants are ex ante identical, the






2 +[ aj − tij − ci(θ)]
2 − ri
o
dG(θ) − φ =0 , i =1 ,2. (17)
We deﬁne a long-run equilibrium as a collection {ci(·),n i(·),a i,N i,M i}2
i=1 satisfying the cost
equation (1), the ﬁrst-order condition (13), the equation for the endogenous demand intercept,
(15), the adding-up condition (16), and the free-entry condition (17).
We now analyze the long-run eﬀects of (unanticipated) multilateral and unilateral tariﬀ
changes on ﬁrm scope and the size distribution of ﬁrms. For this purpose, we assume that
the industry is in a long-run equilibrium, both before and after the change in tariﬀs. As
before, we assume that, prior to the change in tariﬀs, the two countries are identical, and so
N1 = N2 = N, M1 = M2 = M,a n dt12 = t21 = t.W e ﬁrst consider a small symmetric
reduction in the common tariﬀ t.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the countries impose identical tariﬀs, t12 = t21 = t,a n dc o n s i d e r
the long-run eﬀects of a small symmetric trade liberalization, dt < 0. There exists a marginal




such that all ﬁrms with organizational capability θ>b θ have a reduced number of
product lines, dn(θ) < 0, while all ﬁrms with organizational capability θ<b θ have an increased
number of product lines, dn(θ) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Qualitatively, the long-run eﬀects of a trade liberalization are similar to the short-run
eﬀects: there is a tendency for small ﬁrms with inferior organizational capability (but low
marginal cost) to increase the number of product lines, while the reverse holds for large ﬁrms
with superior organizational capability (but high marginal cost). In contrast to the short run,
however, it is conceivable that n(θ) moves in the same direction for all ﬁrms, namely when
b θ = θ or b θ = θ.
Next, we consider the long-run eﬀects of a small unilateral reduction in the tariﬀ imposed
by country 1 on imports from country 2, t21.
18Proposition 9 Suppose that the countries initially impose identical tariﬀs, t12 = t21 = t,a n d
consider the long-run eﬀects of a small unilateral trade liberalization by country 1, dt21 < 0.




such that all ﬁrms with
organizational capability θ>b θ1 have an increased number of product lines, dn1(θ) > 0, while all
ﬁrms with organizational capability θ<b θ1 have a reduced number of product lines, dn2(θ) < 0.




such that all ﬁrms with
organizational capability θ>b θ2 have a reduced number of product lines, dn2(θ) < 0,w h i l e
all ﬁrms with organizational capability θ<b θ2 have an increased number of product lines,
dn2(θ) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The long-term implications of a unilateral trade liberalization for the size distribution of
ﬁrms are similar to those of the short-run. In the liberalizing country, production becomes
more concentrated in the largest ﬁrms while production becomes less concentrated in the other
country. As was the case for multilateral liberalization, it is conceivable that all ﬁrms within a
country increase or decrease the number of their product lines.
4.3 Globalization and the Size Distribution of Firms
The predictions of our model on the eﬀects of globalization on the size distribution of ﬁrms
are in contrast to what models with single-product ﬁrms predict. Suppose in each country
there is a population of single-product ﬁrms that diﬀer in their (constant) marginal costs of
production, c. Following a multilateral trade liberalization (i.e., a decrease in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ
t), competition becomes more intense in that the endogenous markups over marginal costs
narrow. (In our linear demand model, markups become smaller since the endogenous demand
intercept a decreases. This holds for both the short run, where the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, and
the long-run, where there is free entry of ﬁrms.) But this increase in the intensity of competition
ampliﬁes diﬀerences in marginal costs: a larger fraction of domestic sales will be concentrated
amongst ﬁrms with low marginal costs. That is, standard models with single-product ﬁrms
predict a ﬂattening of the domestic size distribution of ﬁrms following a multilateral trade
liberalization. (In the Appendix, we provide a formal proof of this assertion in the context of a
two-country model where demand is linear.) As we will show in the next section, the opposite
relationship holds true in the data. We call this the globalization-skewness puzzle.
Our theory of multiproduct ﬁrms can explain this puzzle. Indeed, as Proposition 6 and 8
show, a multilateral trade liberalization induces large ﬁrms to shed product lines and small
ﬁrms to add product lines. The short-run eﬀects on the changes in domestic sales by ﬁrm type
are illustrated in Figure 3 for a numerical example. A numerical example of the long-run eﬀects
i sg i v e ni nF i g u r e4 .A sb o t hﬁgures show, a multilateral trade liberalization induces a larger
percentage decline in domestic sales for a (large) high-θ ﬁrm than for a (small) low-θ ﬁrm. That
is, a multilateral trade liberalization results in a less skewed distribution of domestic sales.
We now explain why our results on the relationship between globalization and skewness
are diﬀerent from those of standard models. Holding ﬁxed the number of product lines, what







































Figure 3: The Short-Run Eﬀects of a Symmetric Trade Liberalization on Domestic Sales by
Firm Type. (The parameters are: M = 100, N = 1000, L = 800, σ =0 .0008, θ ∼ U[1,2],a n d







































Figure 4: The Long-Run Eﬀects of a Symmetric Trade Liberalization on Domestic Sales by
Firm Type. (The parameters are: L =8 0 0 , σ =0 .01, r =0 .5, θ ∼ U[1,3],a n dc0 =0 .03;t h e
change in tariﬀ is from t =0 .01 to t =0 .)
20of its domestic market. An increase in the intensity of competition, caused by a multilateral
reduction in trade costs, shifts the ﬁrm’s residual demand curve in its domestic market inwards,
thereby reducing the eﬀective size of the market. In standard models where each ﬁrm has a
single product line, therefore, globalization leads to a steepening of the domestic size distrib-
ution, as discussed above. In our model with endogenous ﬁrm scope, the number of product
lines a ﬁrm chooses to manage is determined not by the eﬀective size of the domestic market
but by the eﬀective size of the world market (faced by that ﬁr m ) .W h i l eas y m m e t r i cr e d u c t i o n
in trade costs shifts the residual demand curve in each country inwards, this indirect eﬀect of
globalization is dominated by the direct eﬀect of the reduction in trade costs, thereby increas-
ing the eﬀective size of the world market. But an increase in the eﬀective size of the world
market dampens diﬀerences in intrinsic eﬃciencies (organizational capabilities), thus leading
to a ﬂattening of the domestic size distribution of ﬁrms.
Following a unilateral trade liberalization, the eﬀective size of the market in the liberalizing
country shrinks (due to the improved access by foreign ﬁr m s ) ,a sd o e st h ee ﬀective size of the
world market faced by ﬁrms in the liberalizing country (who still face the same trade costs).
Hence, both our model and standard single-product models predict that a unilateral trade
liberalization induces a steepening of the domestic size distribution in the liberalizing country.
5E m p i r i c s
In this section, we use ﬁrm-level panel data to test our model’s predictions on the eﬀects of
globalization on the skewness of the domestic size distribution of ﬁr m s .A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i -
tion 6, a reduction in trade costs that is symmetric across countries will induce large, high-θ
ﬁrms to shed product lines and small, low-θ ﬁrms to add product lines. As a result, a symmet-
ric fall in trade costs is associated with less skewness of the domestic size distribution of ﬁrms
within an industry.
The size distribution of ﬁrms is often summarized by the gradient of the logarithm of a
ﬁrm’s sales with respect to the logarithm of its sales rank within its industry (e.g., Axtell,
2001; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Indeed, if the size distribution of ﬁrms were Pareto
(as claimed by some authors), this gradient would be a constant. The following speciﬁcation
extends this methodology by allowing the gradient to vary with the logarithm of the rank of
ﬁrm size and, in particular, with changes in international trade costs:
lnSALESjit = αit + βi lnRANKjit + γi (lnRANKjit)
2 + δ (tlnRANKjit) (18)
+η(TCOSTSit)lnRANKjit + εjit,
where SALESjit are the domestic sales of ﬁrm j in industry i at time t, RANKjit is the
rank of this ﬁrm in the size distribution (the largest ﬁrm has RANKjit =1 ), TCOSTSit is
an ad-valorem measure of trade costs in industry i at time t, αit is an industry-time ﬁxed
eﬀect, and εjit are unobserved determinants of a ﬁrm’s sales. Note that our speciﬁcation is
very ﬂexible. First, by including (lnRANKjit)
2, the speciﬁcation allows for non-linearities in
the relationship between ﬁrm size and size rank. Second, the intercept (αit)i sa l l o w e dt ov a r y






Figure 5: The skewness of the size distribution of ﬁrms.
on lnRANKjit and (lnRANKjit)
2 are allowed to vary across industries. Fourth, by including
tlnRANKjit, the gradient of the size distribution is allowed to follow a time trend.
We are interested in the eﬀects of changes in international trade costs on the “steepness” of
the size distribution of U.S. ﬁrms: as the gradient of lnSALESjit with respect to lnRANKjit
becomes steeper (negative, but with greater absolute value), a greater share of production is
concentrated amongst the larger ﬁrms. From (18), this gradient is given by
∂ lnSALESjit
∂ lnRANKjit
= βi +2 γi lnRANKjit + δt+ η(TCOSTSit).
Our model predicts that a multilateral rise in trade costs (an increase in TCOSTSit) should
be associated with a steeper gradient, and so η<0. Figure 5 provides an illustration.
To estimate (18), we require ﬁrm-level rather than plan-level data. For this reason, we use
ﬁrm-level data from the Compustat database. To compute a ﬁrm’s domestic sales rank and
to identify the relevant freight costs and tariﬀs, we need to carefully deﬁne a ﬁrm’s industry.
T o ob r o a dad e ﬁnition of an industry has two disadvantages: (i) many ﬁrms within the same
industry may not be competing with each other, and (ii) there may be insuﬃcient cross-industry
variation in freight costs and tariﬀs. Too narrow a deﬁnition of an industry runs the risk of
excluding important competitors and relevant freight costs and tariﬀs. For these reasons, we
classify ﬁrms by their primary three-digit SIC industry.
22From the Compustat database we obtained an unbalanced panel of the sales of 4,319 ﬁrms
in 116 three-digit manufacturing SIC industries over the years 1989-2001. We removed exports
and any other sales in foreign markets to calculate each ﬁrm’s sales in the U.S. market. We
then computed each ﬁrm’s rank by domestic sales within its three-digit SIC industry.
Our measure of trade costs is constructed from the Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002)
dataset.6 They distinguish between two types of trade costs: (i) freight and insurance costs,
FREIGHTit, and (ii) U.S. tariﬀs, TARIFFit. We are interested in the variation in these
variables over time and across industries. Freight costs between any two trading partners
are roughly the same in either direction. We therefore treat changes in freight costs over
time as being symmetric across countries. The period covered by our dataset, 1989-2001, is
characterized by bilateral trade agreements such as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
and NAFTA as well as multilateral trade liberalizations in the wake of the Uruguay Round.
Following Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), and in light of the lack of disaggregated time
series data on foreign tariﬀs, we therefore assume that reductions in U.S. tariﬀs are mirrored
by similar reductions in the tariﬀs of major U.S. trading partners.7
The variable FREIGHTit is calculated as freight and insurance charges (C.I.F. imports less
F.O.B. imports) divided by F.O.B. imports by industry and year, while the variable TARIFFit
is the value of U.S. import duties paid divided by F.O.B. imports into the U.S. We are inter-
ested in changes in intrinsic freight costs and tariﬀs rather than changes in FREIGHTit and
TARIFFit caused by changes in U.S. trade patterns. We therefore computed FREIGHTit
and TARIFFit holding ﬁxed the U.S. trade pattern in 1995 (the mid-point of our sample).
Speciﬁcally, for each four-digit SIC industry, year, and foreign country, we compute the ad-
valorem measures of freight costs and import tariﬀs. We then aggregate these measures to the






where IMl,k,1995 is the value of imports (F.O.B.) in the four-digit industry l from country k,a n d
Li is the set of four-digit industries in the three-digit industry i. Given that both FREIGHTit
and TARIFFit are ad-valorem measures of trade costs, we have followed Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (2006) in summing the two so as to obtain our measure of trade costs: TCOSTSit =
FREIGHTit +TARIFFit. Descriptive statistics for these data (including controls) are shown
in Table 1.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (18). The coeﬃcient on
TCOSTSlnRANK is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at a very high level of conﬁdence.
As predicted by our model, a symmetric increase in trade costs is associated with greater
dispersion within an industry as the size of the larger ﬁrms increases relative to that of the
smaller ﬁrms.
6The time span of our data is driven by the time span of this dataset. For years outside of this range industry
codes are diﬀerent and therefore diﬃcult to concord into industry classiﬁcations that are consistent with those
of Compustat.
7Indeed, Head and Ries (1999) ﬁnd that U.S. and Canadian tariﬀ reductions are highly collinear.
23Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Number Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
lnSALES 35,367 4.017 2.552 -6.908 11.823
lnRANK 35,367 3.071 1.445 0 5.781
(lnRANK)2 35,367 11.518 8.656 0 33.417
TCOSTS 35,367 5.970 4.148 0 34.853
lnGDP 35,367 8.995 0.112 8.851 9.199
lnINTGAP 35,367 -0.268 0.182 -0.511 0.039
TCOSTS× lnRANK 35,367 15.982 10.800 0 99.968
lnGDP × lnRANK 35,367 27.616 12.988 0 52.186
lnINTGAP × lnRANK 35,367 -0.840 0.754 -2.937 0.211
A potential concern is that our variables are correlated with macroeconomic trends. To
address this issue, we include the interaction of GDP with ﬁrm rank, lnGDPt lnRANKjit,
in our regression. Another potential concern is that changes in the size distribution are cor-
related with changes in credit market conditions which aﬀect small ﬁrms more than large
ﬁrms. For this reason, we include the interaction between the logarithm of the diﬀerence be-
tween the nominal interest rates charged to high-risk and low-risk borrowers and ﬁrm rank,
lnINTGAPt lnRANKjit. (The data on GDP and the interest rate gap are collected from the
Economic Report of the President, 2005, tables B-2 and B-73.) As the second column of Table
2 shows, the coeﬃcients on our key variable, TCOSTSlnRANK, keeps its predicted negative
sign and remains statistically signiﬁcant at a very high level of conﬁdence. The negative and
strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on lnINTGAP lnRANK strongly suggests that the perceived
credit risk is negatively related to ﬁrm size. One explanation for the negative and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on lnGDP lnRANK is that small ﬁrms are more constrained than large ﬁrms in
their ability to expand in good times, possibly due to credit constraints.
The last two columns in Table 2 report the results of estimating equation (18) in four-year
diﬀerences (after de-meaning the data by industry-year). Relative to the regression in levels,
the estimated coeﬃcients on the variables of interest are similar. This shows that the long-run
responses to changes in international trade costs mirror the short-run responses, as predicted
by our theory. Note that the time-diﬀerencing also purges the data of any time-invariant
ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects.
We performed two other robustness checks. First, we re-estimated equation (18) for only
those ﬁrms that were in the sample for the whole period. Second, we re-estimated equation (18)
removing the smallest ten percent of ﬁrms in each industry and year. The estimated coeﬃcient
on the trade-cost variable barely changed. Both speciﬁcations yielded nearly identical coeﬃcient
estimates as the baseline speciﬁcation.
24Table 2: Estimation of the Size Distribution.
Dep. var.: level level diﬀ.d i ﬀ.
lnSALES (1) (2) (3) (4)
TCOSTS −0.0359∗∗∗ −0.0356∗∗∗ −0.0392∗∗ −0.0279∗∗
×lnRANK (0.0108) (0.0091) (0.0174) (0.0133)
t × lnRANK −0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗ −0.0290∗∗∗ −0.0152





Number Obs 35,367 35,367 6,325 6,325
R-squared 0.8756 0.8804 0.5749 0.6204
The industry-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients on lnRANK and (lnRANK)
2 are suppressed. Level regressions include full
3-digit SIC-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by
industry-year.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%,
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed a theory of multiproduct ﬁrms and endogenous ﬁrm scope.
In our model, ﬁrms have constant marginal costs of production for each of their product lines.
But there are decreasing returns to the span of control at the ﬁrm level: the more product
lines a ﬁrm manages, the higher are its marginal costs. Firms diﬀer in their organizational
capability: the greater is a ﬁrm’s organizational capability, the less responsive are its marginal
costs to an increase in the number of its product lines.
A key feature of our model is that marginal costs are endogenously determined and depend
on the ﬁrm’s inherent organizational capability and its proﬁt-maximizing choice of scope. In
equilibrium, ﬁrms with greater organizational capability expand their scope to such an extent
that, paradoxically, they have higher marginal costs. This solves the empirical puzzle on the
positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and ﬁrm size.
Since marginal costs are endogenous, our model allows us to explain why trade liberalization
has productivity eﬀects at the ﬁrm level. Even without the selection eﬀects that are the focus
of the recent literature on trade and ﬁrm heterogeneity, trade liberalization has aggregate
productivity eﬀects because ﬁrms respond diﬀerently to market integration. This diﬀerential
response to trade liberalization across ﬁrms implies systematic changes in the size distribution
of ﬁrms. A multilateral trade liberalization leads to a ﬂattening of the domestic size distribution
in each country. This solves the globalization-skewness puzzle that we establish in the empirical
part of the paper, using ﬁrm-level data on U.S. manufacturing. In contrast, a unilateral trade
liberalization induces a more skewed size distribution in the liberalizing country.
257 Appendix
The Relationship between Tobin’s Q and Firm Size. To examine the relationship
between Tobin’s Q (i.e., the ratio between market value and book value) and ﬁrm size, we
use the Compustat database. We use data for the most recent year available, namely 2004.
We follow Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) in calculating market value as the market value of
common equity (product of items 24 and 25), plus the book value of preferred shares (item
130) and short- and long-term debt (items 34 and 9). Book value is computed similarly but
uses book (rather than market) value of common equity (item 60). Our measure of ﬁrm size is
ﬁrm sales (item 9). Our variable lnTi is then the logarithm of the ratio of ﬁrm i’s market value
a n db o o kv a l u e ,w h i l elnSALESi is the logarithm of ﬁrm i’s sales. Deleting outliers where
lnTi ≥ 4, we are left with 5,965 observations.
We regress lnTi on lnSALESi and a set of industry ﬁxed eﬀects (according to the ﬁrm i’s
main line of business). Using 2-digit SIC ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on lnSALESi is -0.5648
with a standard error of 0.0036. Using 4-digit SIC ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on lnSALESi
becomes -0.4489 with a standard error of 0.0037.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Recall that
Ψ(c;θ) ≡ q(c){P(q(c)) − (1 + 1/θ)c} − r.
The ﬁrst-order condition (6) then states that Ψ(c(θ);θ)=0 . We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. We show that Ψ(c;θ) is strictly decreasing in c whenever Ψ(c;θ) ≥ 0.T a k i n gt h e
derivative with respect to c,w eo b t a i n
Ψc(c;θ)=−(1 + 1/θ)q(c)+
£
P(q(c)) − (1 + 1/θ)c + q(c)P0(q(c))
¤
q0(c)








where the second equality follows from using the ﬁrst-order condition for output, equation (3).
Suppose the expression in curly brackets is nonnegative. Then, Ψc(c;θ) < 0. Suppose now that

















We will now show that δ ≤ 0,a n ds oΨc(c;θ) < 0. Applying the implicit-function theorem to
















+ P(q(c)) − c
¾
.
Since our assumption on demand implies that 2P0(q(c)) + q(c)P00(q(c)) < 0,w eh a v eδ ≤ 0 if
















− P0(q(c)) ≤ 0.
Since P(q(c)) ≥ c and 2P0(q(c))+q(c)P00(q(c)) ≤ 0, the last inequality is implied by P0(q(c))+
q(c)P00(q(c)) ≤ 0, which holds by assumption. Hence, δ ≤ 0,a n ds oΨc(c;θ) < 0 whenever
Ψ(c;θ) ≥ 0. In particular, Ψc(c(θ);θ) < 0 for any θ>0. It follows that for each θ, there exists
at most one value of c such that Ψ(c;θ)=0 . (In fact, there exists exactly one such value of c
for all those θ such that Ψ(c0;θ) ≤ 0, while there exists no such value of c for all θ such that
Ψ(c0;θ) > 0.)




Step 3. We now show that c(θ)=c0 i fa n do n l yi fθ ≤ e θ,w h e r e
e θ ≡
c0q(c0)
[P(q(c0)) − c0]q(c0) − r
is the unique solution to Ψ(c0;θ)=0 .S i n c e Ψθ(c;θ) > 0, it follows that Ψ(c0;θ) ≤ 0 for all
θ ≤ e θ,a n dΨ(c0;θ) > 0 for all θ>e θ.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e Ψc(c;θ) < 0 whenever Ψ(c;θ) ≥ 0,i t
follows that Ψ(c;θ) < 0 for all θ ≤ e θ and all c>c 0. Hence, the corner solution c(θ)=c0 obtains
for all θ ≤ e θ. In contrast, for all θ>e θ, c(θ) is given by the ﬁrst-order condition Ψ(c(θ);θ)=0 .
Step 4. We ﬁnally show that c(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for all θ ≥ e θ. Using the implicit







where the inequality follows from Ψθ(c(θ);θ) > 0 and Ψc(c(θ);θ) < 0.S i n c ec(θ) is uniquely
deﬁn e db yt h eﬁrst-order condition (for θ ≥ e θ), this comparative static result holds globally.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Tobin’s Q is given by
T(θ) ≡
[P(q(c(θ))) − (1 − α)c(θ)]q(c(θ))
r + αc(θ)q(c(θ))
, (20)
27which is independent of θ for θ ≤ e θ since then c(θ)=c0.A s s u m e n o w t h a t θ>e θ so that
c0(θ) > 0.
Step 1. Consider the numerator in (20),
[P(q(c(θ))) − (1 − α)c(θ)]q(c(θ)). (21)
We claim that this term is strictly decreasing in θ. Since the net proﬁt per product line is
strictly decreasing in θ, this claim is correct if c(θ)q(c(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ. Suppose now
instead that c(θ)q(c(θ)) is strictly decreasing in θ. Then, the term in (21) is strictly decreasing
in α.S i n c eα ∈ [0,1], this implies that the term is strictly decreasing in θ if revenue per product
line,
P(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ)),










where the second equality follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal output choice,
equation (3), and the inequality from c0(θ) > 0 and q0(c(θ)) < 0.













































where the second equality follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal output choice,












28and so equation (22) does indeed hold.


































Clearly, the ﬁrst term is strictly positive for θ>e θ (and equal to zero for θ<e θ). We now show
that the sum of the second and third terms is also strictly positive for θ>e θ. Collecting terms











Since c0(θ) > 0 for θ>e θ (Proposition 1), this expression is positive if the expression in curly
brackets is positive. From the ﬁrst-order condition (6), θ>c (θ)/[P(q(c(θ))) − c(θ)],a n ds o








where c ≡ c(θ).U s i n gt h eﬁrst-order condition for optimal output, (3), and (19), this inequality














I tc a ne a s i l yb ev e r i ﬁed that this inequality is implied by our assumption on demand, P0(q)+
qP00(q) ≤ 0.H e n c e ,S(θ) is increasing in θ.
Step 2. We now show that a ﬁrm’s book value,
b(θ)=n(θ)r + n(θ)αc(θ)q(c(θ)),















But S(θ) is increasing in θ, as we have shown in step 1. Moreover, from equation (23) in the
p r o o fo fL e m m a1 ,c(θ)/P(q(c(θ))) is increasing in θ. Hence, the inequality does indeed hold.
Step 3. Finally, we show that a ﬁrm’s market value,
m(θ)=n(θ)P(q(c(θ)))q(c(θ)) − n(θ)(1 − α)c(θ)q(c(θ)),
is increasing in θ. It is immediate to see that m(θ) is constant for θ ≤ e θ. We need to show that
m(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for θ ≥ e θ. We can rewrite the market value as the sum of the
ﬁrm’s net proﬁt and its book value:
m(θ)=n(θ){[P(q(c(θ))) − c(θ)]q(c(θ)) − r} + b(θ).
Clearly, a high-θ can always replicate the choice of product lines by a small-θ ﬁrm, but at lower
unit costs, and so a ﬁrm’s net proﬁti si n c r e a s i n gi nθ.M o r e o v e r ,b0(θ) > 0 for θ ≥ e θ,a sw e
have shown in step 2. Hence, the ﬁrm’s market value is strictly increasing in θ for θ ≥ e θ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrst-order con-
dition for the optimal choice of the number of product lines, (8), we obtain dc(θ)/dτ =
−Φτ(c(θ);θ;τ;t)/Φc(c(θ);θ;τ;t),w h e r eΦs denotes the partial derivative of Φ with respect
to s ∈ {c,τ}.S i n c e t h e ﬁrst-order condition deﬁnes a proﬁtm a x i m u m ,Φc(c(θ);θ;τ;t) < 0,



























where the second equality follows from (8). Taking the derivative with respect to θ,a n d
collecting terms, we obtain
dΦτ(c(θ);θ;τ;t)
dθ
































30where the second inequality is the condition on demand from Proposition 3. As regards the
















But this last inequality is implied by our condition on demand, d[−q0(c)/q(c)]/dc > 0,a n dt h e
fact that τ ≥ 1. Hence, the curly bracket in equation (24) is strictly positive. Since the net proﬁt
per product line is strictly positive and c0(θ) > 0, it follows that dΦτ(c(θ);θ;τ;t)/dθ > 0,a n d
so dc(θ)/dτ is strictly increasing in θ. Since the mass of product lines is ﬁxed, the endogenous








r e s p o n dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nτ by





respond to an increase in τ by buying product lines (and so dc(θ)/dτ > 0).
















where c(θ;t) ≡ c0n(θ)1/θ. We need to show that the term in curly brackets is strictly positive.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrst-order condition for output choice, equa-









where the inequality follows from our assumption on demand, equation (2). This implies that
the markup P(q(c)) − c is decreasing in marginal cost c since
d[P(q(c)) − c]
dc
= P0(q(c))q0(c) − 1 < 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (26) and P0(q(c)) < 0. Hence, P(q(c)) − c ≥ P(q(c +































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from equation (26), the equality follows from the ﬁrst-order
condition for the optimal choice of quantity, equation (7), and the second inequality follows
from equation (27). Hence, dS(θ)/dκ,κ ∈ {t,τ}has the same sign as dn(θ)/dκ. The sign of
dn(θ)/dκ then follows from Propositions 3 and 4.











































Using equation (14), it can easily be seen that c0(θ) >θ −1(1+θ)−1c(θ). The claim then follows.
We have thus shown that d
dn [nci(n;θ)]
¯ ¯
n=ni(θ) is positive and strictly increasing in θ.




n=ni(θ) ∆ni(θ)dG(θ) < 0.B u t t h i s
follows immediately from the following observations: (i) d
dn [nci(n;θ)]
¯ ¯
n=ni(θ) is positive and
strictly increasing in θ,( i i )∆ni(θ) > 0 for θ<b θ and ∆ni(θ) < 0 for θ>b θ,a n d( i i i ) R
∆ni(θ)dG(θ)=0 .
The ﬁnal step consists in showing that ∆ai < 0 for each country i. But this follows
immediately from the previous results and the equilibrium condition for ai, equation (15).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . We need to show that dc(θ)/dt is positive for high-θ (i.e., high-c)
ﬁrms and negative for low-θ (i.e., low-c) ﬁrms. Under symmetric tariﬀs, the ﬁrst-order condition









{(a − c(θ)) + (a − t − c(θ))}
=0 , (28)







where the subscript s ∈ {t,c} indicates the partial derivative with respect to variable s.N o t e
that Ωc(c(θ);θ;t) < 0 since Ω(c(θ);θ;t)=0is a proﬁt maximum. Consequently, the sign of
dc(θ)/dt is equal to the sign of Ωt(c(θ);θ;t). Market clearing for product lines requires that
some ﬁrms sell product lines while others purchase product lines, and so the sign of Ωt(c(θ);θ;t)
will vary with θ. In the following, we will show that dΩt(c(θ);θ;t)/dθ > 0.
Taking the partial derivative of Ω(c(θ);θ;t),a sd e ﬁned by equation (28), with respect to
the cost parameter t, yields
Ωt(c(θ);θ;t)=2
½


















2 +( a − t − c(θ))2 − r
(a − c(θ)) + (a − t − c(θ))
.
Inserting this expression into equation (29) and simplifying, we obtain
Ωt(c(θ);θ;t)=
½
2(a − c(θ))(a − t − c(θ)) + r


















2(a − c(θ))(a − t − c(θ)) + r











(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2¤
− r











From the ﬁrst-order condition (28), the expression in curly brackets is strictly positive. Since
dc(θ)/dθ > 0, the sign of dΩt(c(θ);θ;t)/dθ is thus equal to the sign of [1 − 2da/dt].
We claim that da/dt < 1/2. To see this, suppose ﬁrst that da/dt =1 /2. Then, dΩt(c(θ);θ;t)/dθ =
0, and so three cases may arise: (i) dc(θ)/dt > 0 for all θ,( i i )dc(θ)/dt < 0 for all θ,o re l s e
33(iii) dc(θ)/dt =0for all θ. But cases (i) and (ii) cannot occur since there is a ﬁxed number of
product lines. Hence, case (iii) must apply: dc(θ)/dt =0for all θ; that is, there is no trade
in product lines. But then, from equation (15), da/dt = σN/[1 + 2σN] < 1/2.A c o n t r a d i c -
tion. Next, suppose that da/dt > 1/2. Then, dΩt(c(θ);θ;t)/dθ < 0. Hence, there exists a
threshold type b θ ∈ (θ,θ) such that — following a small increase in t —a l lﬁrms with θ<b θ
purchase product lines (and so dc(θ)/dθ < 0)w h i l ea l lﬁrms with θ>b θ sell product lines (and
so dc(θ)/dθ > 0). From Lemma 3, it follows that this “reshuﬄing” of product lines reduces the
endogenous demand intercept a. From (15), the direct eﬀect of an increase in t on a, holding
n(θ) ﬁxed, satisﬁes ∂a/∂t < 1/2. Hence, the total eﬀect of a small increase in t on a satisﬁes
da/dt < 1/2. A contradiction. We have thus shown that da/dt < 1/2, and so there exists a
threshold type b θ, such that — in response to a small increase in t —a l lﬁrms with θ<b θ sell
product lines while all ﬁrms with θ>b θ acquire product lines. The reverse conclusion holds if
dt < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . We need to show that there exists a b θ ∈ [θ,θ] such that dc(θ)/dt
is positive for θ>b θ and negative for θ<b θ. As shown in the proof of Proposition 6, the sign
of dc(θ)/dt is equal to the sign of Ωt(c(θ);θ;t),w h e r e
Ωt(c(θ);θ;t)=2
½






−2(a − t − c(θ)) +
2c(θ)
θ
since dr/dt =0in the long run. Using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 6,
Ωt(c(θ);θ;t)=
½
2(a − c(θ))(a − t − c(θ)) + r













(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2¤
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We now claim that da/dt < 1/2 in the long run. To see this, suppose otherwise that
da/dt ≥ 1/2. Then, the proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm of type θ would strictly increase following a small




(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2ª
> 0 for all θ.
But this is inconsistent with free entry.
Since da/dt < 1/2, equation (30) implies that dΩt(c(θ);θ;t)/dθ > 0. Hence, the assertion
of the proposition follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . We need to show that dc1(θ)/dt21 is negative for high-θ (i.e.,
high-c) ﬁrms and positive for low-θ (i.e., low-c) ﬁrms, while the opposite holds for dc2(θ)/dt21.




(ai − ci(θ))2 +( aj − tij − ci(θ))2 − ri
(ai − ci(θ)) + (aj − tij − ci(θ))
. (31)









where the subscript s ∈ {t,c} indicates the partial derivative with respect to variable s.
Note that Ωi
c(ci(θ);θ;t12,t 21) < 0 since Ωi(ci(θ);θ;t12,t 21)=0is a proﬁt maximum. Con-
sequently, the sign of dci(θ)/dt21 is equal to the sign of Ωi
t21(ci(θ);θ;t12,t 21). Market clearing
for product lines requires that some ﬁrms sell product lines while others purchase product lines,
and so the sign of Ωi
t21(ci(θ);θ;t12,t 21) will vary with θ. In the following, we will show that
dΩ1
t21(ci(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ < 0 and dΩ2
t21(ci(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ > 0.























2(a − c(θ)) −
(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2















where the second equality follows from equation (31). Taking the partial derivative of this






(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2 − r












From the ﬁrst-order condition, the expression in curly brackets is strictly positive. Since
dc(θ)/dθ > 0, the sign of dΩ1
t21(c(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ is thus equal to the sign of −[da1/dt21 +
da2/dt21].


























2(a − c(θ)) −
(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2



















where the second equality follows again from equation (31). Taking the partial derivative of






(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2 − r













35From the ﬁrst-order condition, the expression in curly brackets is strictly positive. Since
dc(θ)/dθ > 0, the sign of dΩ2
t21(c(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ is thus equal to the sign of [1 − da1/dt21 −
da2/dt21].
We claim that 0 <d a 1/dt21 + da2/dt21 < 1. To see this, suppose ﬁrst that da1/dt21 +
da2/dt21 ≥ 1. Then, dΩ1
t21(c(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ < 0 and dΩ1
t21(c(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ ≤ 0. Hence,
there exists a threshold type b θ1 ∈ (θ,θ) in country 1 such that ﬁrms of type θ>b θ1 in country
1w i l ls e l lp r o d u c tl i n e st oﬁrms of type θ<b θ1. In country 2, either n2(θ) remains unchanged,
namely if da1/dt21+da2/dt21 =1 , or else there also exists a threshold type b θ2 ∈ (θ,θ) such that
ﬁrms of type θ>b θ2 in country 2 will sell product lines to ﬁrms of type θ<b θ2.F r o mL e m m a3 ,
it follows that this “reshuﬄing” of product lines reduces the endogenous demand intercepts a1
and a2. Moreover, from (15), the “direct” eﬀect of an increase in t21 on the demand intercepts
satisﬁes ∂a1/∂t21 < 1/2 and ∂a2/∂t21 =0 . It follows that the total eﬀect of a small increase
in t21 on the demand intercepts satisﬁes da1/dt21 + da2/dt21 < 1. A contradiction. A similar
argument can be used to show that da1/dt21 + da2/dt21 ≤ 0 leads to a contradiction.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . We need to show that there exist thresholds e θ1 ∈ [θ,θ] and
e θ2 ∈ [θ,θ] such that dc1(θ)/dt21 is negative for θ>e θ1 and positive for θ<e θ1,w h i l et h e
opposite holds for dc2(θ)/dt21. As shown in the proof of Proposition 7, the sign of dci(θ)/dt21
is equal to the sign of Ωi




2(a − c(θ)) −
(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2
















2(a − c(θ)) −
(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2






















(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2 − r


















(a − c(θ))2 +( a − t − c(θ))2 − r













We now claim that da1/dt21 +da2/dt21 < 1 in the long run. To see this, suppose otherwise
that da1/dt21+da2/dt21 ≥ 1. Consider the change in the proﬁt per product line of a country-1
ﬁrm with marginal cost c(θ):
d[π11(c(θ)) + π12(c(θ))]
dt21












36Free entry implies that this expression cannot be strictly positive for all values of c(θ). Hence,

















Free entry implies that this expression cannot be strictly positive for all values of c(θ) ≤ a − t
(which holds by assumption). Hence, da2/dt21 ≤ 0. A contradiction.
We now claim that da1/dt21 + da2/dt21 > 0 in the long run. To see this, suppose oth-
erwise that da1/dt21 + da2/dt21 ≤ 0. Free entry implies that d[π11(c(θ)) + π12(c(θ))]/dt21
cannot be strictly negative for all values of c(θ). Hence, da2/dt21 ≤ 0.F r e ee n t r ya l s oi m p l i e s
that d[π22(c(θ)) + π21(c(θ))]/dt21 cannot be strictly negative for all values of c(θ). Hence,
da2/dt21 > 0. A contradiction.
Since 0 <d a 1/dt21 + da2/dt21 < 1, it then follows that dΩ1
t21(c(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ < 0 <
dΩ2
t21(c(θ);θ;t12,t 21)/dθ.
Trade Liberalization and Single-Product Firms. We now brieﬂy show that a standard
model with heterogeneous single-product ﬁrms has very diﬀerent implications for the eﬀects of
a symmetric trade shocks on the size distribution of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, consider the symmetric
two-country setting of Section 4. In each country, there is a mass L of identical consumers with
utility function (11).
All ﬁrms produce a single product line but ﬁrms diﬀer in their marginal costs. The fraction
of ﬁrms with marginal cost less than or equal to c ∈ [c,c] is given by F(c). In the short run,
the mass M of ﬁrms is ﬁxed. In the long run, there is free entry of ex ante identical ﬁrms:
ﬁrms get a draw of their marginal cost c from the distribution function F only after paying the
ﬁxed entry fee φ.




(a − c)2 +
L
8
(a − c − t)2,
where t is the symmetric (speciﬁc) tariﬀ,a n da the endogenous demand intercept. For simplic-








Consider now a symmetric increase in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t. We claim that in both the short
run and the long run, da/dt > 0. In the short run, this can be shown by taking the derivative
of the endogenous demand intercept a with respect to t, holding the mass M of ﬁrms ﬁxed.
To see that da/dt > 0 in the long run, suppose otherwise that da/dt ≤ 0. But then the gross
proﬁt Π(c) of each ﬁrm would decrease, which is inconsistent with free entry.
The rank of a ﬁrm with marginal cost c, R(c),i st h em a s so fﬁrms with (weakly) larger
sales: R(c)=MF(c). We are concerned with how the gradient of the domestic size distribution,















where the second equality follows from applying the implicit function theorem to lnR(c) −
lnM − lnF(c)=0 . It follows that the sign of the gradient ∂ lnS(c)/∂ lnR(c) is equal to the
sign of ∂ lnS(c)/∂c, and depends on the mass M of entrants only insofar as M aﬀects domestic
sales S(c). The logarithm of domestic sales of a ﬁrm with marginal cost c is
lnS(c)=l n ( L/8) + ln(a2 − c2).






Recall that an increase in the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ t induces an increase in the endogenous demand
intercept a, both in the short run and in the long run. But the increase in a reduces 2c/(a2−c2),
i.e., makes the size distribution ﬂatter.
This shows that a symmetric trade liberalization (a reduction in t) leads to a steeper size
distribution, in contrast to the prediction of our multiproduct model (and the empirical evidence
presented in this paper).
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